A non-relativistic quantum mechanical theory is proposed that describes the universe as a continuum of worlds whose mutual interference gives rise to quantum phenomena. A logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions about objects in a multiplicity of worlds. In this logical framework, the continuum of worlds is treated similarly to the continuum of time points; both "time" and "world" are considered as mutually independent modes of existence. The theory combines elements of Bohmian mechanics and of Everett's many-worlds interpretation; it has a clear ontology and a set of precisely defined postulates from where the predictions of standard quantum mechanics can be derived. Probability as given by the Born rule emerges as a consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The theory describes a continuum of worlds rather than a single world or a discrete set of worlds, so it is similar in spirit to many-worlds interpretations based on Everett's approach, without being actually reducible to these. In particular, there is no splitting of worlds, which is a typical feature of Everett-type theories. Altogether, the theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the identification of observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement, while still being an objectively deterministic theory.
Introduction
The ideas proposed in this paper have grown out of dissatisfaction with the existing interpretations of quantum mechanics. The problem is not that quantum mechanics does not yield the correct experimental predictions, but rather that there is still no consensus about the metaphysical content of the theory, that is, the story that quantum mechanics tells us about reality. Some people simply turn the tables and consider the lack of a clear, indisputable metaphysical interpretation not as a bug but rather a feature, denying the existence of objective reality altogether. Doing so, however, appears to me as an act of resignation rather than a satisfying solution to the conundrum.
The theory that I am going to propose offers a transparent and consistent interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Measurements are taken to be ordinary processes, there is no objective "collapse of the wavefunction" and the wavefunction is not a physically existing entity. There is no distinction between a "quantum system" and a "classical apparatus" to explain the definite outcome of measurements and their probabilistic behavior. Elementary particles have at all times and in all worlds a well-defined position in 3D space, there are no such things as "probability clouds" and "objective uncertainty". Rather, probability emerges as the consequence of insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. The quantitative form of such epistemic probability does not rely on a "quantum equilibrium hypothesis" as in Bohmian mechanics, or a "branch weight" as in Everettian mechanics, but is straightforwardly derived from the concept of a volume density of trajectories in configuration space, which is regarded as an objective feature of the physically existing universe. More precisely, the universe is conceived of as a continuum of trajectories endowed with a certain density that determines how densely the trajectories are packed in different regions of configuration space. Each trajectory corresponds to a world, and all worlds equally exist. The here-proposed theory is different from Bohmian mechanics , and the here-proposed theory (C). Everettian mechanics describes a universe of constantly branching, vaguely-defined worlds that evolve through Hilbert space. Bohmian mechanics describes a wavefunction plus one single precisely-defined world that both evolve through configuration space. The here-proposed theory describes the a continuum of preciselydefined worlds of varying density, which evolves through configuration space, and where each world corresponds to a Bohmian trajectory. In the latter theory there is no physically existing wavefunction. Instead, the wavefunction is conceived of as a generating function for the continuum of trajectories, which constitutes the physically existing universe.
in that there is no physically existing wavefunction and in that there is more than one world, and it is different from Everettian mechanics in that there is no physically existing wavefunction and in that the worlds are precisely defined and do not split ( Figure  1 ). The theory is based on ideas initially published as a preprint draft (Boström, 2012) , which has been completely re-worked and enhanced, in particular by adding a logical framework to properly deal with propositions about physical systems in a multiplicity of worlds. Ideas similar to those proposed here and in Boström (2012) , in so far as they entail a continuum of worlds existing in parallel, have also been brought up by Tipler (2006) and Sebens (2014) . Tipler's proposal is separately discussed in section 8.4. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a logical framework is introduced to properly deal with propositions evaluated in a multiplicity of worlds and at a multiplicity of times, whereby time and world are treated as so-called modes of existence. The concept of a metaworld is introduced as an entity that consists of a continuum of worlds. Also, the concept of an instance is introduced, which comes in three flavors. A timeinstance is an instance of an object at a specific time, a world-instance is an instance of an object in a specific world, and a time-world-instance is an instance of an object at both a specific time and in a specific world. In section 2.2, the logical framework is applied to the case of particles as the basic entities of the theory. It is postulated that each world corresponds to one and only one trajectory of the universe in configuration space, so that worlds can be identified with trajectories. Each time-world-instance of the universe corresponds to the configuration of all particles in the universe at a specific time and in a specific world. In section 3, probability is introduced as an epistemic concept deriving from the insufficient knowledge of observers about which world it is that they live in. To this aim, in section 3.1 the well-known Laplacian rule is generalized to a continuous number of possibilities with the help of a volume measure that is further specified in section 3.2 as the volume of worlds whose trajectories are crossing a certain region in configuration space. In section 4, the role and the physical meaning of the wavefunction is discussed, as well as the role and the meaning of configuration space (section 4.1) and of the metaworld (section 4.2). It is held that the wavefunction does not represent itself a physically existing entity but rather an abstract mathematical tool to determine the form of the physically existing metaworld. A minimal set of postulates is given in section 5 to formally define the theory. In section 6, measurement is introduced as a special case of an otherwise ordinary interaction between a system of interest and a measurement apparatus, yielding the familiar Born rule as well as providing a justification of representing observables as self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space. The "collapse of the wavefunction" is derived as a useful but merely subjective description at the level of an individual world with a particular measurement outcome. In section 7, spin is added to the theory and the measurement of a spin-1/2 particle is exemplified. In the Discussion section 8.1, the relation between objective reality and subjective experience in the presence of a multiplicity of worlds is addressed. Then, the proposed theory is compared to Bohmian mechanics (section 8.2), to the manyinteracting-worlds approach of Hall et al. (section 8.3) , and to Tipler's formulation of quantum mechanics (section 8.4). Lastly, in section 8.5, I respond to a criticism raised by Vaidman against the idea of a continuum of worlds.
Logical framework
After having long been ignored and ridiculed, the many-worlds interpretation has in recent years become a scientifically recognized and intensely discussed interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Tegmark, 1998; Vaidman, 2008; Wallace, 2008, for modern accounts) . Among the main objections against the many-worlds interpretation is the criticism that it is too vague about the notion of worlds, and that the entire conception of many worlds existing in parallel is absurd in the first place (cf. Kent, 1990; Barrett, 2011) . Indeed, at first sight it appears problematic or even absurd to consider our world as one out of many worlds, for we usually speak of the world and understand it as everything that exists. The inventor of many-worlds quantum theory, Hugh Everett III, originally did not use the term "world", and he named his theory the "relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics" (Everett, 1957) and "the theory of the universal wavefunction" (Everett, 1973) . However, the notion of worlds became more and more popular in discussions of Everett's theory (cf. Werner, 1962; Barrett, 2011) , and was eventually introduced to the public by Bryce DeWitt (DeWitt, 1970) . I will stick to the now firmly established convention of using the term "world", though I will use it in a very specific manner. In the extended logical framework that I will propose, there are two modes of existence, and these are time and world. The key idea is very simple. In conventional logic, objects cannot at the same time have a property and not have that property. In the proposed logical framework, objects cannot at the same time and in the same world have a property and not have that property. So, while in conventional logic there is only one mode of existence, which is time, in the extended framework there are two modes of existence, which are time and world. We will first concentrate on the time mode and suppress the world mode. Once we have clarified how to treat time in a logical framework, and once we have set up the terminology, we can straightforwardly extend the framework to also include the world mode. We shall see that world and time are treated in an analogue manner, and since we are already quite familiar with the concept of time -at least we have some intuition in using this concept -we will be able to understand how the concept of world can be understood as well. In a similar sense that classical mechanics can be understood as a many-times theory, non-relativistic quantum mechanics can be understood as a many-worlds theory in addition to its many-times aspect.
Why should one take it that quantum mechanics, in contrast to classical mechanics, needs a world mode of existence in addition to the time mode? Because in quantum mechanics the worlds interfere with each other. This interference of worlds is responsible for the typical "quantum" phenomena that go beyond classical explanation. For example, an electron going through a double-slit produces an interference pattern because its trajectory in one world interferes with its trajectories in other worlds. In the classical theory there are no interference patterns produced by individual particles, so there is no need to consider additional worlds that interfere with each other. Other experimental paradigms where a many-worlds interpretation yields a straightforward and transparent explanation is neutron interference (Vaidman, 1998) , quantum computation (Deutsch, 2012) and counterfactual measurement (Elitzur & Vaidman, 1993; Vaidman, 1994 Vaidman, , 2009 . After all, the most important reason to favor a many-worlds interpretation is not simply to satisfy a somewhat romantic attitude but rather to better understand quantum phenomena and to avoid serious conceptual difficulties.
General formulation
Let us begin with the more familiar concept of time. Physically existing objects have their properties each at a given instance of time. An instance of time is also referred to as a time point, but in the following we shall drop the explicit distinction between time points and times whenever there is no risk of confusion. That is, by saying that an object o has a particular property F at a given time t, we mean that the object has the property at the time point t. We denote this statement by the formula p(t)="F o @t" and call it an anchored proposition. As usual in a physical theory, time points are represented by real numbers, so the set T of all time points equals the entire real line, T = R. The temporal anchor plays the role of the present time of an anchored proposition. Consider an unanchored proposition like "the traffic lights are green". In one moment the traffic lights may be green, in another moment they may be red, or yellow, or something else. We can anchor an unanchored proposition by adding "now" to it, where "now" is an unspecified temporal anchor to be treated as a variable. Formally, the partial expression "F o" occurring in the proposition p(t)="F o @t" is the body of the proposition, and t is the (temporal) anchor. If the temporal anchor is unspecified, that is, it is not given by a real number but remains a variable, then the proposition remains unevaluated. We can evaluate it either by specifying a numerical value for t, or by quantifying over t, so that, for example, for a given time period T ⊂ T the proposition "∀(t ∈ T ) : F o @t" is understood as "object o has property F during T ", which is either true or false. The proposition is then anchored to the specified interval T , which may also coincide with the entire time domain T . In the latter case we may use the shorthand notation "∀t" to mean "∀(t ∈ T )", and similarly "∃t" to mean "∃(t ∈ T )".
Since real numbers form an ordered set, a temporal anchor t can be set into relation with other time points, so that time points that are smaller or bigger than t, in the usual order of R, play the role of respectively past (earlier) or future (later) time points relative to t. We then can then formalize the proposition "Object o will have the property F " as "∃(t > t) : F o @t ", and the proposition "Object o never had the property F " as "∀(t < t) : ∼F o @t ". The variable t is then the unspecified anchor of both propositions and represents the "now" of the proposition, that is, the present time relative to which the body of each proposition is anchored in the future and the past, respectively.
Let us now extend the logical framework by adding world as another mode of existence. That is, an object has properties only with respect to a particular time and a particular world. Anchored propositions are then of the form p(t, w)="F o @(t, w)", which is understood as "object o has property F at time t and in world w". The expression "F o" is, again, the body of the anchored proposition p(t, w), and the expression "@(t, w)" is the anchor, with t being the temporal anchor and w being the world anchor. Just like the temporal anchor t plays the role of the present time of the proposition, the world anchor w plays the role of the actual world of the proposition. Let us denote the set of all worlds by W and allow to quantify over both worlds and times, so that, say, for a given set W ⊂ W the formal proposition p(t)="∀(w ∈ W )∃(t < t) : F o @(t , w)" reads "for all worlds in W the object o once had the property F ". That proposition involves the variable t as an unspecified temporal anchor, and it remains unevaluated until t is specified or quantified. Consider another different example involving the variable w as an unspecified world anchor: the formal proposition p(w)="∀t : F o @(t, w)" reads "in the actual world the object o always has the property F " and remains unevaluated as long as the actual world w is not specified or quantified. If the actual world of the proposition lies within some given set W ⊂ W, then the proposition becomes p="∀t∀(w ∈ W ) : F o @(t, w)", which is understood as "in all worlds contained within W the object o always has the property F ". The proposition p contains no free variables and hence is an evaluated proposition. In the case W = W we may shorten "∀(w ∈ W)" into "∀w", and "∃(w ∈ W)" into "∃w".
There is yet another, logically equivalent, way of understanding anchored propositions, which might be favorable under certain circumstances. The occurence of an object at a particular time and in a particular world can be considered an instance of that object. Then, there are different instances of one and the same object at different times and in different worlds, but it is still the same object that is instantiated. In terms of instances, thus, the formula p(t, w)="F o@(t, w)" is understood as "the instance o@(t, w) has the property F ". Note that the talk of instances and the talk of objects are just two different ways to read a proposition. We may switch back and forth between the two readings as we like, and keep in mind that doing so does not affect the content of the proposition. There are three different ways of using instance talk. One of these ways is the talk of time-world instances that we have just encountered. Another way is to translate only the time mode into an instance and leave the world mode as it is. Thus, instead of speaking of an object having some property at a specific time and in a specific world, one may speak of a time-instance of the object having the property in a specific world. So, for example, instead of saying that "Joe went to school when he was six in world w", one may say that "six-year-old Joe went to school in world w". Formally, a time-instance of Joe is denoted as Joe t ≡ Joe@t, and in the given example t would denote some point in time when Joe was six years old. The third way is to translate only the world mode into an instance, so that Joe w ≡ Joe@w is the instance of Joe in world w.
It is helpful to visualize objects as being extended into both the time mode and the world mode. That is, one may conceive of modes in a manner analogous to dimensions. Instances then collapse objects along some of their modes. A time-instance collapses the object along the time mode so that it remains extended along the world mode. For example, a time-instance of an electron is an electron cloud (Figure 2) . A world-instance collapses the object along the world mode so that it remains extended along the time mode. For example, a world-instance of an electron is a trajectory. Lastly, a time-worldinstance collapses the object along both modes, so that it loses its modal extension and becomes a "modal point". For example, a time-world-instance of an electron is a point located in 3D space. Instances inherit the properties that the objects have at their instantiation. For example, a time-world instance e t,w of an electron e is located at the position x that the electron occupies at time t in world w. And as for Joe, his time-world instance Joe t,w has the property of going to school.
It should have become clear from the setup of the framework and the chosen formulations that I understand neither the present time nor the actual world as absolute entities. Rather, I regard all times and all worlds as equally existing, although they do not exist in the same sense in which objects exist. An object exists at a time and in a world. Without a time and a world the object cannot exist. So times and worlds are preconditions of existence, or more precisely, in the terminology of the here-proposed framework, times and worlds are modes of existence 1 .
Fig. 2:
The particle density of the electron in a hydrogen atom in the bound 3d(m = 0) state as an illustration of an electron cloud. In the interpretation of the metaworld theory, an electron cloud is not a probability cloud but rather the time-instance of an electron, extended in configuration space, which in this case coincides with the 3D space. In each world, the electron is at any time in a well-defined position, moving around on a Bohmian trajectory.
Particles
As usual in a physical theory, we will from now on restrict the set of objects to systems of elementary particles. Technically, a system of particles is a mereological sum of particles, that is, particles are in a part-whole relationship with systems. A one-particle system consists of only one particle, and an N -particle system consists of N particles. If a particle is part of a system which is part of another system, then the particle is also part of the latter system. We shall not dive into the details of the theory of mereology, and the reader may be referred to textbook literature (cf. Varzi, 2014) . Systems of particles cannot be naively identified with macroscopic objects. Macroscopic objects (ships, dogs, people), may lose or gain particles and still remain the same macroscopic object, which is not the case for systems. It is a highly nontrivial question how to define macroscopic objects and how to identify them across time. Of course, it should be no less problematic to identify macroscopic objects across worlds. If in one world Joe is lacking one hair compared to our world, it would appear natural to assume that it is still Joe who is lacking a hair in that world, and not a completely different person. I believe these issues can somehow be settled, so that it makes sense to speak of one and the same object (including people) across different times and across different worlds. Luckily, though, these difficulties do not affect the quantum theory that I am going to propose, as they do not arise for elementary particles. An elementary particle at different times simply is the same particle, only at different times, and a particle in different worlds simply is the same particle, only in different worlds. (Recall that instances are no copies; it is the same particle that only occupies different positions in space at different times and in different worlds.)
The symbol "o" denoting a system of particles in a proposition like "F o @(t, w)" is taken as a rigid designator in a sense analogous to how Kripke (1981) introduced the term into modal logic: the symbol refers to the same system at all times when it exists, and in all worlds where it exists. Since we stay in the non-relativistic domain, there is no particle creation or annihilation. Thus, if a particle exists in one world at one time, then it exists at all other times in that world. Let us further demand particle conservation across worlds, so that when a system o exists at one time and in one world, it also exists at any other time and in any other world. There can be no particles missing and no particles being added to the system across worlds and across time. The system of all particles is identified with the universe, and the number of particles in the universe is assumed to be finite and equal to some fixed number N .
Trajectories
Particles have a fundamental property, which is their position in three-dimensional space. A particle can at some time t and in some world w have the position q, and at another time t and in another world w have the position q . Let u be the universe consisting of N particles, and q = (q 1 , . . . , q N ) be a complete list of the positions of all particles. Then this list of positions, which is called a configuration of the universe, can mathematically be interpreted as a vector in the 3N -dimensional space Q := R 3N , which is called the configuration space. A point in the 3N -dimensional configuration space corresponds to the position of N particles in the three-dimensional space (3D space, in short). There is a subtle but profound issue with defining the configuration space as the vector space R 3N , and this issue will later be discussed and addressed by re-defining the configuration space as the tensor space R 3×N instead. The following considerations, though, are independent of this choice of definition.
Let F q be the property of having the configuration q ∈ Q, then the proposition "F q u @(t, w)" asserts that the universe has the configuration q at time t and in world w. Now let us assert that at every time there is for every world a unique configuration of the universe. In propositional calculus this is translated into the conjunction of the following two propositions:
The first proposition asserts that for every time and for every world there is (at least) one configuration of the universe, and the second proposition asserts that that configuration is unique. So let q w (t) be the unique configuration of the universe at time t and in world w, then the above postulate is equivalent to saying that there is a set of trajectories q w : T → Q in such a way that there is a one-to-one relation between worlds w and trajectories q w , w ↔ q w .
Vice versa, if q is a trajectory then there is exactly one world w q corresponding to it. Consequently, we may identify worlds and trajectories. This should not be taken to suggest that worlds literally are trajectories, in the sense of a synonym. The term "world" just has a different linguistic function than the term "trajectory". But whenever the term "world" is used in the theory, we know that it corresponds to a unique trajectory. With regard to the considerations further above, a trajectory may be regarded as a world-instance of the universe, that is, it is fixed to one specific world but extended into the time mode. A time-world-instance of the universe would then be a particular configuration of the universe. Up to now there have been no further restrictions imposed on the actual form of the trajectories. They are not required (so far) to be continuous or differentiable or anything else; they might be erratic and discontinuous, jumping around across configuration space from one moment to another in a fractal manner, resembling a random process rather than a deterministic evolution. The actual form of the trajectories is what the physical laws will yield. These laws are sorting out unphysical trajectories from physical ones, which leads us to a quite general definition of a physical law: A physical law is a restriction on the set of logically possible ways the universe may evolve in time. There are (vastly) more logically possible ways the universe may evolve than there are physically possible ways. Consequently, the set of logically possible worlds is much bigger than the set of physically possible worlds. A physical theory essentially defines how the set of logically possible worlds is to be restricted to the set of physically possible worlds by conditions imposed on the corresponding trajectories, and these conditions come in the form of differential equations.
Probability
The success of quantum mechanics is often regarded as evidence for objective probability or objective uncertainty. Quantum mechanics, so we are told, enforces a picture of Nature not being decided about "how to proceed" when a measurement takes place, or even not being decided about "how to be" with respect to unobserved system properties. However, Bohmian mechanics as well as Everettian mechanics offer a different picture in this respect. Both theories deny the necessity of objective probability. Rather, the universe is at all times in a certain (quantum) state, and probability only comes into play as a consequence of incomplete knowledge of the observer, a concept of probability that is referred to as subjective or epistemic probability. In Everettian mechanics, the world of an observer is splitting up into multiple worlds during a measurement process, and the observer does not know which world he or she (as a macroscopic system capable of conscious experience) will end up in after the measurement. There are puzzling issues with this kind of interpretation (cf. Kent, 1990; Squires, 1990; McInerney, 1991; Saunders & Wallace, 2008; Wallace, 2010) , but we will not get into detail here. In Bohmian mechanics, the particles in the universe are at all times in a certain configuration, but the observer does not (precisely) know which configuration that is. The challenge of both interpretations is not merely a philosophical one, but also how to get the empirically correct numerical values for the probabilities as given by Born's rule. ForΠ a being a projector onto the eigenspace of some eigenvalue a of an observableÂ, Born's rule says that for a system being at time t in a state described by the wavefunction Ψ t , the probability to find the observableÂ obtaining the value a in a measurement at time t, is given by
As for Everettian mechanics, there are numerous attempts to derive Born's rule using various approaches involving observer memory states (Everett, 1957 (Everett, , 1973 , infinite ensembles (Hartle, 1968) , frequency operators (Farhi et al., 1989) , decoherence (Saunders, 1998; Wallace, 2010) , consistent histories (Omnès, 1992; Dowker & Kent, 1996) , and decision theory (Deutsch, 1999; Rae, 2009 ). All these approaches are still controversial. As for Bohmian mechanics, Born's rule is derived on the basis of an additional quantum equilibrium hypothesis, whose status and justification is a controversal issue as well. The quantum equilibrium hypothesis (QEH) asserts that the probability density of the configuration of a system described by the wavefunction Ψ t is at some time point t given by
in which case the system is said to be in quantum equilibrium. By virtue of the continuity equation, then, the probability distribution ρ t is guaranteed to satisfy relation (5) for all times t, a feature that is called equivariance. As the metaworld theory is a combination of Bohmian and Everettian mechanics, it may come to no surprise that it avoids objective probability in favor of an epistemic account. Probability comes into play as a measure of the subjective uncertainty of an observer about the world he or she actually lives in, which is a somewhat sloppy way of saying that he or she does not precisely know which world mode is to be used when determining the trajectory of the universe that governs his or her own experience. We will use that sloppy talk since it is much shorter and simpler to grasp, but we shall keep in mind that it has to be understood in a more sophisticated sense.
Beyond Laplace
In his famous "Essay on Probability", Laplace (1814; 1902) introduced probability as the degree of belief to obtain a desired outcome from a finite set of possibilities. More precisely, if A is the set of desired outcomes and Ω is the set of all possible outcomes, then the probability to obtain a desired outcome reads
where | · | counts the number of elements. There are numerous ways to justify Laplace's rule, but most of them are circular. For example, deriving Laplace's rule from an assumption of uniform probability on the set Ω only shows that Laplace's rule is consistent with probability theory. The very notion of probability itself, though, cannot be derived from probability assumptions. What Laplace had in mind, was to postulate a quantity called "probability" that applies to a certain kind of situation where we have to quantify our degree of belief that something happens. Whenever we are completely indifferent which one of a given finite set of possibilities is actually realized, then we may apply Laplace's rule. This conception of probability is an epistemic conception, that is, it relates to the knowledge of an observer. Two observers with distinct states of knowledge may attribute distinct probability distributions to the same set of possibilities. There is no objective probability distribution, so probability is nothing existing "out there" (cf. de Finetti, 1936) . I adhere to this conception of subjective probability, and I think it is all one needs to also understand quantum mechanics. The direct translation of Laplace's rule to the situation of an observer in an objectively existing multiplicity of worlds would be to take Ω as the set of all worlds, because each world may possibly be the world of the observer. However, in the metaworld theory there is a continuum of worlds, so there is no such thing as the "number" of worlds, and the ratio (6) would be ill-defined. We therefore have to generalize Laplace's rule to infinite sets, but how may this be reasonably accomplished?
Assume that a small golden nugget has been baked into a cake, and then the cake is cut into pieces of different size. Which one of the pieces should Joe select in order to maximize the probability to find the nugget? It is intuitively clear that he should select the biggest piece, but what does "big" mean? There is nothing to count here, no Laplacian rule that would give Joe a prescription to calculate probabilities by the ratio of numbers of cases, as the number of possible locations of the nugget within the cake is uncountably infinite. However, there is a sense in which the set of possibilities for the nugget to be located in a piece of cake is larger for a bigger piece than for a smaller piece, and that sense is based on the concept of volume. It is a mathematical fact that an uncountably infinite set of points can be ascribed a finite volume. Instead of counting discrete possibilities, Joe should apply a volume measure, in this case the Lebesgue measure λ(V ) =´V d 3 x. A physical volume measure is always calibrated to a fixed standard volume V 0 , so that it measures the volume of a given region in space in units of the standard volume. For example, in SI units a spatial region V is measured in units of a standard volume contained within a fixed region V 0 corresponding to one cubic meter, so the calibrated volume measure would be defined by
Independent of the calibration, the probability to find the nugget in a piece of cake filling the region V is given by
where V is the spatial region filled by the entire cake. So far it has been assumed that the cake is uniformly distributed over the region V. To generalize the situation consider that the cake has been broken into little pieces, though still large enough to contain the nugget, and that these little pieces have been distributed across several closed boxes of volumes V 1 , . . . , V K . Which box should Joe select? Naively selecting the biggest box would not necessarily be a good choice, because the box may contain only few small pieces of cake, while a smaller box may contain a larger amount of cake. Now, the key for maximizing the probability of finding the nugget is to use a volume measure based on the spatial density of the cake. Let ρ be the spatial density of the cake, so that ρ(x) = ρ 0 at spatial points where there is cake, and ρ(x) = 0 elsewhere, then
is a calibrated measure for the volume of cake (or the amount of cake) contained within the spatial region V , measured in units of the volume of cake (amount of cake) contained within a standard region V 0 . The actual value of ρ 0 does not matter, as long as it is a positive number. Provided that Joe knows the density function of the cake, he will be able to select the box containing the biggest amount of cake and thereby maximize the probability to get the golden nugget, which is given by the formula (8), with the measure of cake volume given by (9).
World volume
At this point let us stop and reconsider the situation. We have seen that in order to calculate probabilities it is not always possible to count discrete possibilities, and that even in situations where there is an infinite set of possibilities, yet a continuum of possibilities, we can calculate probabilities using a volume measure, and that such a volume measure should be based on a density function. Of course, the example of Joe trying to find a golden nugget in non-uniformly distributed pieces of cake is just an illustration. What we are really aiming at is calculating the probability of finding a particular world within a continuum of worlds. To this aim, we have to go for a suitable volume measure on the set of worlds W, which is based on a density function. This volume measure should measure the volume of worlds (the amount of worlds) contained at a given time within a given region in configuration space.
In section 2.3 we have seen that there is a one-to-one correspondence between worlds and trajectories in configuration space. Thus, for every world w there is a unique trajectory q w in configuration space, and this trajectory is parametrized by the time parameter t. The trajectory point q w (t) is the configuration of the universe in world w at time t. Different trajectories are not allowed to cross each other, because otherwise there would be more than one world for an individual configuration (at the crossing point of the trajectories), which is forbidden by the uniqueness requirement (2). A system of non-crossing trajectories is a deterministic system, which means that each trajectory is completely determined by any one of its points (see Earman, 2004; Vaidman, 2014 , for thorough discussions on the role of determinism in modern physics). Up to now, we have nowhere specified that the trajectories have to obey a differential equation. They may be (so far) non-differentiable, yet even discontinuous, but still they would be deterministic in the sense that they would be completely determined by any one of their points. There is a one-to-one correspondence between each trajectory q w and any one of its trajectory points q w (t) for any given time point t. So, let us fix a time point t and let ρ t be the density of trajectory points at time t, then for any given Q ⊂ Q the function
is a measure for the volume of worlds, whose trajectories cross the region Q at time t. Note that Q is not a region in 3D space but in configuration space, and we use the shorthand notation dq to denote the integration over configuration space. The world volume is measured in units of a standard world volume that is contained at some time t 0 in a fixed region Q 0 . The standard volume should be nonzero and is otherwise arbitrary. Provided that ρ t is normalizable over Q, we may choose Q 0 = Q, so that the world volume would be measured in units of the total volume of worlds existing at time t 0 . Later on, we shall see that this volume is constant in time, so that the choice of t 0 is arbitrary. Definition (10) is quite general since it entails the case of finitely many worlds, of countably many worlds, and of a continuum of worlds. For the case of countably many worlds (including the case of finitely many worlds), the world density takes the form
so that µ t (Q) simply counts the number of worlds whose configuration at time t is contained within the region Q. For the case of uncountably (continuously) many worlds, the world density can take any form, but it should at least be everywhere non-negative,
If we additionally require the world volume to be finite at all times, that is
X a b Fig. 3 : Generalization of the Laplacian concept of subjective probability to the case of continuously many possibilities. a) In the finite case, the subjective probability of finding oneself in a world enclosed within a certain region (square) in configuration space equals the ratio of the number of worlds enclosed in that region by the total number of worlds. b) In the continuous case, the same probability is given by the volume of worlds contained within the given region, divided by the overall volume of worlds. The world volume is obtained by integration of the world density over the given region in configuration space.
where we understand´dq ≡´Q dq, then the probability that the world of the observer crosses at time t the region Q ⊂ Q is given by
Say, Joe is at time t about to measure an observable A that obtains values a 1 , a 2 , . . . in mutually disjoint and exhaustive sets of worlds W 1 , W 2 , . . ., that is, W i ∩ W j = ∅ for i = j, and i W i = W. Furthermore, say that the trajectories in these worlds are at time t crossing the respective regions Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . in configuration space. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between worlds and trajectories, and since there is a one-to-one correspondence between trajectories and their points at time t, for t being arbitrarily given, the regions Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . are also mutually disjoint and exhaustive. Then, the probability p k that Joe will find himself in a world where A obtains the value a k is given by
Since P t is a probability measure on Q and since the regions Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . are mutually disjoint and exhaustive, the numbers p k fulfill the requirements of a probability distribution, that is p k ≥ 0, and k p k = 1.
The wavefunction
A central element of quantum theory is the wavefunction Ψ t , and a great challenge for any interpretation of quantum mechanics is to give a meaning to the wavefunction. Does it represent a physical entity or is it just a mathematical tool to calculate probabilities? No doubt the wavefunction is physically significant, as it appears in the fundamental equations from where observable values are derived. But beyond its physical significance, the physical meaning of the wavefunction is subject to longstanding controversial debates. In Bohmian mechanics, the wavefunction represents a physical entity, sometimes called the pilot wave, or the guiding field, and it is conceived of as a physical field in configuration space that guides all particles in the universe along their trajectories. In Everettian mechanics, the wavefunction is also a physically existing entity that fills the entire universe, and, moreover, the wavefunction is all there is in the universe. Particles and macroscopic objects only appear as patterns formed by the wavefunction in the course of its temporal evolution (cf. Wallace, 2010) . Here, I wish to propose a different picture. The wavefunction is, in this picture, not a physically existing entity itself, but rather an abstract mathematical tool to determine the form of a physically existing continuum of trajectories of varying density in configuration space, called the metaworld, which in turn is identified with the universe. The wavefunction thus has an ontic meaning rather than an epistemic one: it represents a compact and complete description of the universe. Let me spell this out in some more detail.
Configuration space
For systems of more than one particle, the wavefunction is a function not in the threedimensional space but in the 3N -dimensional configuration space. This raw mathematical fact is a serious obstacle towards a straightforward physical interpretation of the wavefunction. For if the wavefunction is taken to be (or to represent) a physically existing entity, then should not the configuration space be considered the real space, instead of the 3D space? And even if the wavefunction is taken to be just a mathematical construction, is the configuration space not still a more adequate representation of physical reality than the 3D space? Consider a single particle. According to the metaworld theory, the particle is in every world and at every time located at an exact point in 3D space. Let us concentrate on one individual world w. At each time t the particle is located at a certain position q w (t). As all time points are considered to be equally real, the particle in world w is physically represented not by a single point in 3D space but rather by its entire trajectory q w , which is a one-dimensional object in space and time, it is a curve and not a point of dimension zero. As all worlds are taken to be equally real as well, the particle is altogether physically represented by a continuous bundle of trajectories from the set Γ = {q w | w ∈ W}. In the same way as the particle's trajectory in one world is composed out of continuously many points, one point per time point t, the trajectory bundle is composed out of continuously many trajectories, one trajectory per world w. Now consider N particles. In world w and at time t these particles are located each at an exact position in 3D space. Say, particle n is located at the point q w,n (t), with n = 1, . . . , N . The mathematical representation of the location of the particles is a list of their three-dimensional positions, q w (t) ≡ (q w,1 (t), . . . , q w,N (t)). This list of positions can mathematically be interpreted as a vector in the 3N -dimensional space R 3N , which is commonly taken as the configuration space. However, is the configuration space just a mathematical construction or is it a physically existing entity? A trajectory in configuration space can be interpreted as representing N particles moving through the real 3D space, where "moving" just means that at different time points there are different positions taken by the particles. These N particles form a system, which is the mereological sum of the particles. Thus, a trajectory through configuration space can alternatively be interpreted as representing one single object, the universe, moving through configuration space. These two different interpretations are equivalent, but one interpretation, the one that views the universe as a unified object, better reflects the phenomenon of quantum nonlocality. Why so? In a local theory, each individual particle trajectory q w,n must be a solution of a hyperbolic differential equation, and indeed classical mechanics is such a local theory (ignoring here the delicate issue of the gravitational potential). However, quantum mechanics is a not a local theory in this respect. The trajectories of individual particles are not solutions to hyperbolic differential equations. However, as we will see further below, the trajectory q w of the entire universe is a solution to a hyperbolic differential equation. The reason being essentially that the trajectories of individual particles depend on the wavefunction, and the wavefunction is a function on configuration space and not on 3D space. As a consequence, the movement of an individual particle depends on the instantaneous positions of the other particles, however distant in space they are. It is one of the most puzzling features of quantum mechanics, though, that such nonlocal interdependency between particles cannot be exploited for superluminal signaling, as has been proven in the context of Bohmian mechanics by Valentini (1991b) . Intriguingly, thus, quantum mechanics is a nonlocal theory, on account of the mathematical definition of locality, but it is a local theory with respect to Einstein locality, which amounts to the assertion that superluminal signaling is impossible. In other words, Nature as described by quantum mechanics is epistemically local, that is, it appears to observers as local, in the sense that they cannot communicate or gain information in a nonlocal manner, but ontologically, with respect to sheer existence, Nature is nonlocal. To better reflect the ontological nonlocality of Nature, I consider it more adequate to view the universe as one unified entity extending in time and configuration space, and not in time and 3D space. Now, there is a widely ignored problem with interpreting the configuration space R 3N as the real space, and it is that the three spatial dimensions of each particle are lumped together into one column vector with 3N components. While for most physicists this might appear rather unproblematic, it makes the theory vulnerable against a subtle but profound criticism put forward by Monton (2002) . As the author writes, the problem is essentially ". . . that nowhere in the 3N-dimensional space is it specified which dimensions correspond to which particles", which leads the author to conclude that "the wave function ontology is an undesirable ontology for quantum mechanics". Monton's criticism applies to those quantum mechanical theories that entail wavefunction realism in some way, such as Bohmian mechanics and Everettian mechanics. But it would also apply to the here-proposed theory if one favors the configuration space as the real space in order to pronounce quantum nonlocality as a natural phenomenon.
Monton's criticism can straightforwardly be addressed by separating spatial dimensions and particle associations into the 3 × N tensor space R 3×N , which in the following will be referred to as the configuration space Q, instead of R 3N . A point q ∈ R 3×N is a rank-2 tensor, that is, a matrix
Since any tensor space is also a linear space, and in that sense still a mathematical vector space that can be endowed with an inner product just like ordinary rank-1 vector spaces, one does not sacrifice mathematical structure. Also, there is no difficulty in defining wavefunctions Ψ, Φ on the tensor space R 3×N instead of R 3N , so that the Hilbert inner product can be defined as
which is a shorthand notation of
A trajectory q w represents the movement of N particles through 3D space in time. A point q = q w (t) on the trajectory represents the configuration of the universe at time t, and the (i, j)-th component of q corresponds to the i-th spatial component of the position of the j-th particle at t. The confusion of spatial dimensions and particle associations criticized by Monton does not arise, as it is clearly specified which spatial dimensions correspond to which particles.
Metaworld
According to the view so far developed, the universe as a whole is physically represented by a continuous bundle Γ = {q w } of trajectories in configuration space, where each trajectory q w ≡ (q w,1 · · · q w,N ) represents the movement of all particles in the universe.
In order for the picture to be complete, there is one more feature to be provided: the density of the trajectories in configuration space. At any given time t, the trajectories may in some regions of configuration space be more densely packed than in other regions, and this feature is governed by a family of volume measures M = {µ t } on configuration space, where each volume measure µ t is derived from a density function ρ t on configuration space via (10). So, the metaworld is uniquely determined by the trajectory bundle Γ and the family M of volume measures, and it may formally be represented by the tupel Υ = (Γ, M). The metaworld, so I propose, is an adequate and complete picture of the physically existing universe. The wavefunction Ψ t is not a physically existing entity itself but rather an abstract generating function that determines the form of the metaworld. In order for this to make sense, the wavefunction Ψ t must contain all information necessary to uniquely determine the form of the metaworld, that is, the course of each individual trajectory as well as the density of the trajectories in configuration space. The course of each individual trajectory is determined by the guiding equation of Bohmian mechanics, which in the context of the here-proposecd theory should be rather called a trajectory equation. That is, each trajectory q w is a solution of the first-order differential equation
where the vector field
is called the world flow, defined by
and where the scalar field
is called the world density. The set of all solutions yields the set Γ = {q w }, and each trajectory q w ∈ Γ corresponds to exactly one world w ∈ W. Since the set of solutions is uncountable, so is the set of worlds. Now, why is ρ t called the world density and j t called the world flow ? Because if the wavefunction Ψ t obeys the Schrödinger equation
for some given HamiltonianĤ, then it can easily be shown that the functions ρ t and j t fulfill the continuity equation
where
is the nabla operator on configuration space, and where the scalar product of two vectors a, b ∈ Q is defined as a · b := N n=1 a n · b n . As Madelung (1927) already pointed out, the functions ρ t and j t describe a locally conserved compressible fluid in configuration space. In fact, Bohmian trajectories are nothing but the pathlines of this fluid. However, Madelung could not provide a consistent physical interpretation of this mathematical fact, so the hydrodynamical interpretation of quantum mechanics was abandoned. Recently, the hydrodynamic interpretation experienced a renaissance, and it was shown that the wavefunction can be completely removed from the theory, leaving only trajectories as the physically existing objects from where all observable values can be calculated (Holland, 2005; Schiff & Poirier, 2012) . Both of these approaches leave it open as to how the fluid is interpreted physically. Holland (2005) remarks that their model is particularly suited to interpret the fluid as being composed of a continuum of "probability elements", in line with the standard view of interpreting the continuity equation as describing a "probability fluid". Whatever probability really is, it is certainly not a material entity. In the interpretation of the here-proposed theory, in contrast, the fluid is interpreted as a material entity, the metaworld, and the fluid elements flowing through configuration space are worlds 3 . Under the usual assumption that the wavefunction vanishes rapidly enough at infinity, one may integrate the continuity equation over the configuration space, which yields ∂ ∂tˆd q ρ t = 0.
Thus the integral of the world density ρ t over the entire configuration space is constant in time and we may set
for t 0 being an arbitrary time point. If we define the world volume by
then the total volume of worlds µ t (Q) is constant in time and equal to unity. The world volume (27) is measured in units of the total volume of worlds existing in configuration space, which is a constant number. Physically, the constancy of µ t (Q) means that there are no worlds being destroyed or created during the evolution of the universe.
As each world corresponds to a really existing trajectory in configuration space, the density function ρ t is not a probability density but the volume density of really existing trajectories. That is, the integral of ρ t over some region Q in configuration space does not yield a probability, but rather the physical volume µ t (Q) of trajectories crossing the region Q at time t. Due to local volume conservation, as expressed by the continuity equation (24), the trajectories have no beginnings and no endings, and neither do they split nor converge. This stands in contrast to Everettian mechanics with its ontology of splitting worlds. As we have seen earlier, one can derive from µ t the epistemic probability P t corresponding to the ignorance of an observer about which world it is that he or she lives in. So, importantly, probability is in the metaworld theory a derived concept rather than a postulated one. This stands in contrast to Bohmian mechanics, where probability is introduced ad hoc via the quantum equilibrium hypothesis. Note that the critical point is not that in Bohmian mechanics the numerical value for the probability is derived from the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, as the numerical value for probability in the metaworld theory is also derived from the ad hoc definition (27), but that the concept of probability is a derived one. In a continuum of worlds distributed with a certain density ρ t , the subjective probability to find oneself within a particular world must be given by (14). The wavefunction as a generating function of the metaworld contains two redundant parameters, which is the global scale and the global phase. This is because the trajectory equation (19) as well as the volume equation (27) are both symmetric under the transformation Ψ t → re iφ Ψ t for r > 0 and 0 ≤ φ < 2π, so the trajectories and their density do not depend on the global scale and the global phase. There are no further redundancies, as can be seen by writing the wavefunction in polar decomposition Ψ t = R t e iSt , so that the trajectory equation (32) and the world volume (33) respectively become
and
Thus, the phase S t of the wavefunction generates the trajectory bundle Γ, and the amplitude R t generates the family of world volumes M. Altogether the wavefunction can be regarded as a generating function of the tupel Υ = (Γ, M) that mathematically represents the metaworld (Figure 4 ). In fact, the wavefunction (not the projective ray in Hilbert space, of which the wavefunction is a representative) contains slightly more information than Υ, namely the global phase and the global scale. If from both the wavefunction and from the metaworld Υ all observable values can be calculated, then the metaworld is actually a less redundant representation of physical reality than the wavefunction. The metaworld is, however, exactly as informative as a projective ray in Hilbert space, which is an equivalence class of wavefunctions differing only by their global scale and phase. From the perspective of Occam's razor, thus, the metaworld theory is at most as ontologically demanding as any theory that entails wavefunction realism. This includes Bohmian mechanics as well as Everettian mechanics. As for Bohmian mechanics, the ontological costs are higher, because in addition to a physically existing wavefunction there are N physically existing point-like particles, which can together be represented as one single trajectory in configuration space. As for the Copenhagen interpretation, for that matter, the wavefunction is usually not taken as a physically existing entity but rather as a mathematical tool to calculate probabilities. However, the Copenhagen interpretation has its own issues, which are not under discussion here.
Postulates
We will now distill the preceding considerations into a small set of postulates that define the theory. Hilbert space mathematics is presupposed, as is the concept of a Hamiltonian. For the sake of simplicity, spin is ignored by now and will later be added. Also, the indistinguishability of particles is neglected, since it is readily addressed in Bohmian mechanics, and the same line of argument can be taken over to the metaworld theory (cf. Oriols & Mompart, 2012; Dürr & Teufel, 2009; Bacciagaluppi, 2003) . The universe is considered to be a closed system of N spin-free particles with masses m n , whose Hamiltonian readsĤ
wherep n = i ∇ n is the momentum operator of the n-th particle, andq n Ψ(q) = q n Ψ(q) is the position operator of the n-th particle, so thatq = (q 1 · · ·q N ) is the configuration operator of the universe, and the operator-valued function V (q) is the potential energy of the universe.
Postulate 1 (Wavefunction)
There is a family {Ψ t } of complex-valued, squareintegrable functions Ψ t : Q → C on configuration space Q ≡ R 3×N , which is parametrized by t ∈ R, and which satisfies the Schrödinger equation
Metaworld
World at time t
Particles
World Fig. 4 : Schematic illustration of the ontology of the proposed theory. The metaworld is a continuous bundle of trajectories in configuration space, with each trajectory uniquely corresponding to a world. The density of the trajectories in configuration space is defined by a density function ρ t = |Ψ t | 2 . Each trajectory q w represents the movement of N point-like particles through 3D space and is a solution of the trajectory equationq w = j t /ρ t , where the flow j t is also derived from the wavefunction. From the density ρ t , the Born rule can be derived as the subjective probability of finding oneself within a particular world. The wavefunction itself is not a physically existing entity but merely serves as a generating function for the density and the flow that both determine the form of the physically existing metaworld.
where the operatorĤ is the Hamiltonian of the universe. The family {Ψ t } is denoted as the wavefunction and is also referred to by the symbol Ψ t . The wavefunction is a complete mathematical description of the universe, and is also called the state of the universe. The parameter t is the time and its domain is denoted by T = R.
Postulate 2 (Trajectories)
There is a set Γ = {q w } of trajectories q w ≡ (q w,1 · · · q w,N ), each parametrized by t, which contains all solutions to the equation
with j t ≡ (j t,1 · · · j t,N ), and j t,n and ρ t defined by (21) and (22), respectively. The time-dependent vector field j t and the time-dependent scalar field ρ t are called the world flow and the world density, respectively. The trajectories in Γ correspond to physically existing entities called worlds, so that each trajectory q w ∈ Γ corresponds to exactly one world w ∈ W in which the universe is at any time t ∈ T having the configuration q w (t) ≡ (q w,1 (t) · · · q w,N ), which is to say that at time t there are N point-like particles located at the positions q w,1 (t), . . . , q w,N (t).
Postulate 3 (World volume)
There is a family M = {µ t } of volume measures on configuration space Q, which are defined by
for all measurable regions Q ⊆ Q and all times t ∈ T . Each µ t (Q) measures the volume of worlds whose trajectory crosses at time t a region Q in configuration space, in units of the total volume of worlds. The object that is mathematically represented by the tupel Υ ≡ (Γ, M) is called the metaworld and is identified with the physically existing universe extended in configuration space and time.
Measurement
In standard quantum mechanics, "measurement" is a primitive notion that cannot be analyzed in terms of ordinary interactions between systems. It is introduced by postulate, so that any attempt to derive if from deeper concepts becomes impossible. In contrast to that, measurements in both Everett's and Bohm's theory are just specially designed but otherwise ordinary interactions between two systems, where one subsystem is the observed system and the other one is the observer system. A special feature of measurements in Bohmian mechanics, as well as in the metaworld theory, is that measurements must eventually result in distinct configurations of the observer system that are taken as indicating distinct measurement results. Since in the metaworld theory, every world is a Bohmian world, and all these worlds are taken as real in an Everettian fashion, we can address the measurement problem with tools of both Bohmian and Everettian mechanics. This will enable us to resolve all relevant aspects of (ideal) measurements, including a transparent and simple derivation of the Born rule and of the "collapse of the wavefunction", which becomes a merely subjective collapse in the world of an observer. Also, a justification of representing observables as self-adjoint linear operators in Hilbert space can be given. Measurements on a subsystem require a factorization of the configuration space and correspondingly of the Hilbert space into an observed system and an observer system. Consider such a factorization with configuration spaces X and Y and Hilbert spaces H X and H Y , so that Q = X × Y and
Next, consider an orthonormal basis B i = {χ i | i ∈ N} for the Hilbert space H X of the observed system. Let us say we want to find out whether the observed system is in one of the states in B i . Then for each i, a "measurement of χ i " would refer to a process where the presence of the state χ i of the observed system causes the observer system to evolve from its initial state φ 0 into a pointer state φ i , hence it causes the transition
As the transition must be unitary, we have φ i 2 = φ 0 2 for all i. For convenience, we suppress the time variable t, since the only thing that matters here is the situation right before and right after the measurement. In order for the pointer states φ i to relate with distinct configurations, they must have non-overlapping support in the configuration space, thus consider a set of non-overlapping subsets Y i ⊂ Y , so that supp φ i = Y i . Let the observed system initially be in an arbitrary superposition ψ = i α i χ i of basis states from B A , so the pre-measurement state reads
According to (34), this state transforms into the post-measurement state
Finally, let the pointer configurations in each Y i correspond to a unique read-off value a i ∈ R. So far the objective description. In order to see what happens in a particular world, we have to go to the subjective description from the perspective of a particular observer Joe. Denote the world-instance of observer Joe in world w by Joe ≡ Joe@w, and denote by q the configuration of world w right after the measurement. By construction, Joe will read off the measurement result a i if and only if he finds the pointer in one of the configurations contained in Y i , which means for the total system that the configuration q of Joe's world w must be contained in the set Q i := X × Y i . The probability for this to happen reads according to (14)
whereΠ i is the projector onto the subspace of H X spanned by the basis vector χ i , and where we have used that φ j (y) = 0 for y / ∈ Y j , and Y i ∩ Y j = ∅ for i = j. So we have derived that the probability p i = P (Q i ) that Joe will read off the measurement result a i equals the probability given by the Born rule (4). The possible outcomes a i together with the probabilities p i define a random variable A whose expectation value reads
where we have used the familiar Dirac notation
and where we have defined the linear operator
which is a discrete, self-adjoint operator on H X with the spectrum {a i }. Thus, it is reasonable to identify the whole measurement process as the process of measuring the operator-observableÂ, whereÂ is a self-adjoint operator whose eigenvalues correspond to the measurement outcomes, and where the expectation value ofÂ is given by the familiar expression (45). Let us go further and derive the "collapse of the wavefunction", which here becomes a subjective collapse experienced in each of the worlds separately and differently. Let t = t 1 be the time immediately after the measurement is finished, so that the postmeasurement wavefunction is given by Ψ = Ψ t 1 , and the post-measurement configuration of Joe's world reads q = q w (t 1 ). From the moment right after the measurement, the trajectory of Joe's world will evolve according to (32), with the point q ∈ Q i fixing which trajectory is his one. then the velocity of the trajectory q w in Joe's world at time t 1 is given by
where j t 1 and ρ t 1 on the righthand side depend, according to (21) and (22), on the post-measurement wavefunction Ψ . Thus, at t = t 0 the evolution of the trajectory q w depends on the post-measurement wavefunction Ψ . By construction q is somewhere in Q i at time t 0 , and for any q ≡ (q, y) in Q i , we have q ∈ Q and y ∈ Y i , and so the wavefunction of Ψ evaluated at q reads
where we have used that Φ j (y) = 0 for j = i. Thus, from the moment right after the measurement, the wavefunction that governs the future fate of Joe's world becomes subjectively equal to the collapsed wavefunction Ψ i := (Π i ⊗ 1)Ψ , although the wavefunction is objectively uncollapsed. From now on, since the Schrödinger equation is linear, the future fate of Joe's world is subjectively governed by the time-evolved collapsed wavefunction
where t ≥ t 0 , and whereÛ (t) is the unitary time evolution operator obeying the Schrödinger equation
withÛ (0) = 1 andÛ −1 (t) =Û † (t) =Û (−t). In contrast to Everettian mechanics, there is no splitting of worlds. Before and after the measurement the total volume of worlds is the same and given by µ t (Q), no worlds are being created or destroyed, split or combined. What happens is that due to the measurement process, the continuum of worlds is partitioned into smaller volumes that contain those worlds where the individual measurement outcomes occur.
As the theory is deterministic at the level of individual worlds, which follows from the unique solvability of the trajectory equation (32), the measurement result obtained in each individual world is determined from the very beginning (see Vaidman, 2014 for a similar view on determinism in quantum mechanics, including a critical review on the ideas proposed in Boström, 2012) . It only appears to be random to the individual observer who spends their lifetime in a particular trajectory without knowing which one. The conundrum of the splitting of persons that occurs in Everett's theory does not show up (see Saunders & Wallace, 2008 , for an intriguing analysis).
Concluding, the here-proposed theory explains 1) the subjective occurrence of probabilities, 2) their quantitative value as given by the Born rule, 3) the justification of using self-adjoint operators on Hilbert space to represent observables, and 4) the apparently random "collapse of the wavefunction" caused by the measurement process and by the subjective experience of individual observers, while remaining an objectively deterministic theory.
Spin
In standard quantum mechanics, as well as in Everettian mechanics, spin is taken to be an intrinsic property of particles. In Bohmian mechanics, as well as in the metaworld theory, spin is merely a feature of the wavefunction. The outcome of a spin measurement therefore depends not only on the state of the particle, which is its position in space, but also on the entire measurement procedure. For this reason, spin is called a contextual property.
Modifications of the theory
Spin is introduced into the theoretical framework by generalizing the complex-valued wavefunction Ψ t : Q → C into a spinor wavefunction, which is a complex vector-valued function
is the dimension of the spin space of the n-th particle, with s n ∈ {0, 1 /2, 1, 3 /2, 2, . . .} being its spin quantum number. A spinor is of the form
where the multi-index σ 1 · · · σ N runs over the entire set of combinations of spin dimensions, of which there are as many as
The scalar product in the spinor space is given by
The Hamiltonian of the universe is modified to include the interaction between spin and electromagnetic field. WithĤ being the spin-enhanced Hamiltonian (which is a quite complicated operator that is not shown here), the Schrödinger equation (31) becomes
and the trajectory equation (32) is replaced by
being the electromagnetic vector potential parametrized by t. Lastly, the definition of the world density (22) has to be replaced by
With these modifications, the postulates 1 through 3 retain their form.
Spin-1/2 measurement
It is instructive to see how a contextual property like spin is measured. The spinor wavefunction of a single spin-1/2 particle is given by Ψ t : R 3 → C , and it is of the form
where Ψ ↑ t and Ψ ↓ t are the up and down spin components of the wavefunction with respect to the z-direction, associated with the observablê
If the particle was alone in the universe, it could not be measured, since a measurement involves at least two systems, one to be measured, the observed system, and one to represent the measurement device, the observer system. Let us now consider such a universe, and let the total system be initially in a state where the observed particle is disentangled from the observer system, so the pre-measurement state reads
where x = q 1 and y = (q 2 , . . . , q N ) are the configurations of the observed particle and the observer system, respectively. The measurement process has to generate entanglement between the particle's spin degree of freedom and the observer system, otherwise there would be no information about the spin of the particle transferred to the observer system. Thus the post-measurement state of the total system obtains the form
where φ ↑ (y) and φ ↓ (y) correspond to the states of the observer system that represent the measurement results "spin up" and "spin down", respectively. Since the transition must be unitary, we have φ ↑ = φ ↓ = φ 0 . The states φ ↑ and φ ↓ describe distinct configurations if and only if they have non-overlapping support in their configuration space Y , thus consider the two disjoint sets Y ↑ and Y ↓ , so that supp φ ↑ = Y ↑ and supp φ ↓ = Y ↓ . A suitable and well-known device that fulfills these requirements for the case of spin-1/2 is a Stern-Gerlach device: The incident electron beam is split into two spatially separated subbeams, each one corresponding to electrons with either spin up or spin down, so the electron beam is itself part of the pointer, which means that even the electron wavefunctions ψ ↑ (x) and ψ ↓ (x) have non-overlapping support after the measurement, that is, each of them becomes entangled with respect to spin and position. In any case, the electrons are made visible by a detection screen or they are registered by an electron detector, and this device can be taken as the observer system. The measurement results reads "up" in a particular world w iff its configuration q = (x, y) is contained in the set Q ↑ := X × Y ↑ . According to (14), this happens with probability
Analogously, we obtain
for Q ↓ = X × Y ↓ . Thus we obtain the same probabilities as in standard quantum mechanics. If the pre-measurement state of the observed system is itself disentangled with respect to spin and position, then it can be written as
where χ is a scalar wavefunction, and |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1. The resulting probabilities then take the more familiar form
An analog procedure carried out with two spin-entangled electrons measured along arbitrary axes would lead to the well-known expression of Bell-type experiments, thereby demonstrating quantum nonlocality.
Discussion

Mind and world
I will not say anything about the relation between mind and world that goes beyond the absolute minimum for to make sense of the theory proposed here. "If there exist many worlds", the opponent might ask, "then why is it that we experience only one of them?" The simplest answer is: "For reasons analog to why we do not experience more than one time point as the present time". A more elaborate answer requires one to agree that perception is a conscious process, and that conscious processes supervene on physical processes. That is to say, a conscious process is taken to be uniquely determined by physical processes. If the physical processes are given then all conscious processes are also given. As all physical processes are determined by the movement of the particles in the universe, a conscious process is eventually determined by the temporal evolution of the configuration of the universe, which is given in each world by the universal trajectory in that world. In some world w 1 the universal trajectory is q w 1 , in some other world w 2 the universal trajectory is q w 2 . Hence, in some world w 1 at time t, Joe is in a certain mental state M 1 uniquely determined by the trajectory point q w 1 (t), and in some other world w 2 at the same time t, Joe is in some other mental state M 2 uniquely determined by the trajectory point q w 2 (t). In no world, however, he is in the mental states M 1 and M 2 together at the same time ( Figure 5 ). In the same manner that traffic lights cannot be green and red at the same time in the same world, Joe cannot be in the mental states M 1 and M 2 at the same time in the same world. Roughly speaking, Joe cannot be experiencing more than one world, because his experience is part of the world, so in different worlds Joe has different experiences. Note that it is still Joe having these experiences, not someone else. As already discussed, it might be favorable to switch to the language of instances. Say, at time t Joe is in one world w 1 experiencing green traffic lights, and in another world w 2 he is experiencing red traffic lights. Although there is no logical contradiction in Joe experiencing both green and red traffic lights at the same time, because he does so in different worlds, it may seem less confusing to talk about different world-instances of Joe experiencing the traffic lights either as red or as green at time t. So rather than There is no logical contradiction, even for the times being equal, because Joe has the experiences in different worlds. In the language of instances, Joe@(w 1 ) is a world-instance of Joe in world w 1 , which corresponds to an entire trajectory of Joe. At a particular time t 1 the world-instance Joe@(w 1 ) is in the mental state M 1 . The same Joe is instantiated in world w 2 as Joe@(w 2 ), which corresponds to another trajectory. At time t 2 this world-instance of Joe is in another mental state M 2 . The instances of Joe are not copies of Joe, they are materially the same Joe, only instantiated in different worlds. Note that in no world Joe is in both mental states M 1 and M 2 at the same time. Hence, observers can not directly perceive more than one world. By making quantum experiments, however, they can observe the effects of the mutual interference between worlds.
speaking of Joe being in a mental state M 1 at time t and in world w 1 , while being in another mental state M 2 at the same time t in another world w 2 , one may equivalently speak of one world-instance of Joe, namely Joe 1 ≡ Joe@(w 1 ) being in one mental state M 1 at time t, and another world-instance of Joe, namely Joe 2 ≡ Joe@(w 2 ) being in another mental state M 2 at time t.
Bohmian mechanics
Although the metaworld theory may be considered a variant of Bohmian mechanics (see Dürr et al., 1992; Deotto & Ghirardi, 1998; Nikolić, 2007; Goldstein, 2009; Oriols & Mompart, 2012 , for excellent reviews), there are conceptual differences between the two theories, in particular with regard to certain critical issues.
The first issue is related to the empirically undeniable statistical character of the measurement results. Just like Everettian mechanics, Bohmian mechanics is a deterministic theory, and there seems to be prima facie no reason why the particles occupy one branch of the post-measurement state rather than another, with a probability whose value is precisely given by Born's rule (4). The proponents of Bohmian mechanics ar-gue that the probability that appears in Born's rule, is an epistemic quantity related to the ignorance of the observer concerning the initial particle configuration. In analogy to classical statistical mechanics, so their argument, one must then introduce a probability density ρ on configuration space that captures the ignorance about the actual configuration which is a result of the ignorance about the initial configuration. The predictions of Bohmian mechanics are indistinguishable from those of conventional quantum mechanics, exactly if
for some arbitrary initial time t. The dynamical laws then guarantee that (71) holds for all times t, a feature that is denoted as equivariance. So, Born's rule is replaced by relation (71) which, in lack of a derivation, has the status of a hypothesis, and it is called the quantum equilibrium hypothesis. From there, with the help of the dynamical laws, the Born rule can be derived, so it no longer exists as an additional postulate. There are attempts to derive the quantum equilibrium hypothesis at least in an approximative manner. Antony Valentini has shown that any arbitrary initial probability density on the configuration space becomes eventually indistinguishable from |Ψ t | 2 at a coarsegrained scale (Valentini, 1991a) . His theorem is partly analogous to Boltzmann's famous H-theorem, which motivates Valentini to name his theorem the subquantum H-theorem. Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi propose to consider the quantum equilibrium as a feature of typical initial configurations (Dürr et al., 1992) . However, I do not consider these justifications of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis satisfactory, for reasons that go beyond the scope of this paper and have to be published separately. In the metaworld theory, there is no quantum equilibrium hypothesis, and all probabilities emerge as subjective probabilities caused by the ignorance of the observer about which world it is that they live in.
The second issue with Bohmian mechanics may at first sight appear rather harmless, but on a closer look it develops considerable destructive power: the issue of empty branches. These are the components of the post-measurement state that do not guide any particles because they do not have the actual configuration in their support. At first sight, the empty branches do not appear problematic but on the contrary very helpful as they enable the theory to explain unique outcomes of measurements. Also, they seem to explain why there is an effective "collapse of the wavefunction", as in ordinary quantum mechanics. On a closer view, though, one must admit that these empty branches do not actually disappear. As in Bohmian mechanics the wavefunction is taken to describe a really existing field, all their branches really exist and will evolve forever by the Schrödinger dynamics, no matter how many of them will become empty in the course of the evolution. This circumstance has led David Deutsch to famously phrase that "pilotwave theories are parallel-universes theories in a state of chronic denial" (Deutsch, 1996;  this is a comment on Lockwood, 1996 ; for a follow-up discussion see Valentini, 2008; Brown, 2009) . Every branch of the global wavefunction describes a complete world which is, according to Bohm's ontology, only a potential world that would be actual if only it were filled with particles. Exactly one branch at a time is occupied by particles, thereby representing the actual world, while all other branches, though really existing as part of a really existing wavefunction, are empty and thus describe some sort of "zombie worlds" with potential planets, oceans, trees, cities, cars and potential people who would talk like us and behave like us, but who do not actually exist. The empty branches of the wavefunction are still real, because the entire wavefunction is considered to be real, but they have no further influence on the particles. So, is there any convincing justification to consider empty branches still as real, beyond mere stipulation? Why is the effective collapse of the wavefunction not a real collapse? If a many-worlds theory may be accused of ontological extravagance, then Bohmian mechanics may be accused of ontological wastefulness. Because, on top of the ontology of the wavefunction with all its branches comes the additional ontology of particles, whose actual configuration degrades the reality of most of the branches of the wavefunction into mere potentiality. Yet, the actual configuration is never needed for the calculation of the statistical predictions in experimental reality, for these can be obtained by mere wavefunction algebra. In the metaworld theory, in contrast, there is no such thing as the actual configuration. All configurations in the support of the wavefunction are equally real, and the objective description of the universe does not need a specification of one of these configurations being the actual one. Probability comes into play not as the ignorance of observers about which configuration is the actual one, but rather as their ignorance about which configuration is the configuration of their world, in a sense that is precisely specified by the here-provided logical framework.
The third issue with Bohmian mechanics is the separate existence of wavefunction and particles, and the strange way that these entities interact with each other. While the wavefunction acts upon the particles, the particles do not act upon the wavefunction. So actually, there is no inter action between the wavefunction and the particles; the relation is asymmetric. However, although the particles never act back on the wavefunction, it is always the particles that define the unique outcome of measurements; it is the particles that define which branch of the wavefunction is the relevant one while the other branches become empty and can be neglected. So, although the particles have the last word, they are yet so powerless that they cannot even act upon the wavefunction. In the metaworld theory, in contrast, there is no separate existence of wavefunction and particles, and no bizarre one-way "inter"-action between these entities. There is only one unified physically existing entity, the metaworld, and the wavefunction is just an abstract mathematical construct that contains all information needed to determine the form of the metaworld. To provide an analogy, it is not the density and the flow of a fluid that exist, but it is the fluid itself that exists, although the density and the flow determine all physically relevant aspects, hence the form, of the fluid. Moreover, in the metaworld theory, particles are not point-like entities like in Bohmian mechanics, but rather all particles together constitute the continuous metaworld, and it is just the time-world instances of the metaworld that we perceive as discrete point-like particles. In the metaworld theory, thus, the dualism between the continuum and the discrete, between wave and particle, is resolved in a unique fashion. Thus, although being formally equal to Bohmian mechanics in many aspects, the metaworld theory draws an entirely different picture of the physically existing universe.
Interaction and interference
Bohmian mechanics can be formulated so that the trajectory equation (19) obtains a Newtonian form
for n = 1, . . . , N , involving the so-called quantum potential
In this formulation, which was the original one introduced by Bohm (1952a; 1952b) , it becomes explicit how the motion of the particles is affected not only by classical forces but also by non-classical forces generated by the quantum potential, which vanishes in the classical limit → 0. Since the quantum potential is a function of the density ρ t = |Ψ t | 2 , Bohm interpreted the non-classical force as the force that the wavefunction exerts on the particles. In a very interesting approach, Hall et al. (2014) propose to replace the density ρ t in (73) with the density ρ K t of a discrete number of trajectories, identified as worlds, so that
where K is the number of worlds. That way, the one-way interaction between the wavefunction and the particles becomes a two-way interaction between worlds, in that the evolution of each world configuration q k (t) is directly determined by all other world configurations. If the worlds are distributed by a probability density equal to |Ψ t | 2 then for K → ∞ the world density ρ K t approaches (in a distributional sense) the standard density, ρ K t → |Ψ t | 2 , hence the theory would reproduce the predictions of standard quantum mechanics in the limit of infinitely many worlds. I find this proposal very fascinating, as it shows that quantum effects can be explained by the interaction between physically existing worlds. I have only two criticisms. One is that I would prefer to call the relation between worlds not interaction but rather interference, because the difference between interaction and interference seems to me a categorical one. Interaction is a relation between systems, while interference is a relation between worlds, that is, between trajectories of one and the same system. For example, an electron in a doubleslit experiment interacts with the walls of the double-slit and with the detection screen behind the slits. On the other hand, a trajectory of the electron passing through one slit interferes with the trajectories of the same electron passing through the other slit.
If one of the slits is closed, then the trajectories of the electron cannot pass the region covered by the closed slit, and all trajectories go through the open slit, interfering with each other and producing a typical single-split diffraction pattern on the screen when the experiment is repeated many times. When the second slit is opened, the trajectories of the particle may pass both slits, and behind the double-slit they interfere with each other, producing a typical double-slit interference pattern on the screen. In each world there is only one trajectory passing through only one of the slits, but since the course of that trajectory is influenced by other trajectories, each belonging to a separate world, one is led to conclude that the typical wave phenomena of particles can be interpreted as the influence that individual worlds exert on one another. This special kind of mutual influence between worlds is different in nature from ordinary interactions between systems, and therefore, so my suggestion, should be identified as interference.
My second criticism of the approach of Hall et al. is, of course, that they assume a finite number of worlds. For one part, if the predictions of standard quantum mechanics are reproduced in the limit of infinitely many worlds, then why not taking infinitely many worlds? The here-proposed theory already involves right from the start an infinite number of worlds while being mathematically much simpler than the proposal by Hall et al.. The metaworld theory may be regarded as the limiting theory obtained from the many-interacting-worlds (MIW) theory of Hall et al. by taking the number of worlds to infinity. For another part, the MIW relies, just like Bohmian mechanics, on a probability assumption. Only if it is assumed that the finitely many worlds are distributed by |Ψ t | 2 , in the sense of a probability distribution, the predictions of standard quantum mechanics are (approximately) reproduced. Thus, it is impossible to conceptually derive probability from the MIW. In contrast, when interpreting |Ψ t | 2 not as a probability density but rather as a volume density, that is, as the density of materially existing continuous stuff, as is done in the metaworld theory, probability can be conceptually derived from the theory. Such interpretation of |Ψ t | 2 as a volume density of worlds, however, is impossible when considering an only finite number of worlds.
Tipler's approach
There is a very interesting formulation of quantum mechanics by Tipler (2006) which seems to be similar in spirit to the ideas proposed here. The author explicitly writes: "The key idea of this paper is that the square of the wave function measures, not a probability density, but a density of universes in the multiverse" (ibid, page 1). Unfortunately, though, Tipler deviates from his initial conception when, for example, he later writes: "In the case of spin up and spin down, there are only two possible universes, and so the general rule for densities requires us to have the squares of the coefficients of the two spin states be the total number of effectively distinguishable -in this case obviously distinguishable -states" (ibid, page 4). Such statement is hard to understand. If the number of universes (or "worlds", as the author also calls them elsewhere in the paper) is two, then what does it mean to "have the squares of the coefficients of the two spin states be the total number of effectively distinguishable [. . . ] states"? The word "state" seems to refer to a universe, or world, and within the same sentence also to something else. How many "states" or "universes" are there, in that situation, two or infinitely many? Such ambiguity and vagueness about the ontological meaning of the terms "states", "branches", "worlds", "universes", is somewhat idiosyncratic for Everett-type theories. In the theory proposed here, in contrast, worlds correspond to well-defined trajectories in configuration space, hence their total number is always uncountably infinite, and spin states are just components of the wavefunction and not labels for, or representatives of, worlds. It seems that after all Tipler sticks to the Everettian ontology of branches rather than to a continuous multiplicity of worlds, in contrast to what the author's initial statement seems to suggest. Other strong indicators for that conclusion are that in Tipler's analysis the universes still split, or "differentiate", as the author also calls it, and that he explicitly writes "the sums in (15) [. . . ] are in 1 to 1 correspondence with real universes", where the referenced formula involves a decomposition of the wavefunction into spin states. Another fundamental difference to the metaworld theory concerns the justification of probabilities. Tipler writes: "The probabilities arise because of the existence of the analogues of the experimenters in the multiverse, or more precisely, because before the measurements are carried out, the analogues are 'indistinguishable' in the quantum mechanical sense. Indistinguishability of the analogues of a single human observer means that the standard group transformation argument used in Bayesian theory to assign probabilities can be applied. I show that the group transformation argument yields probabilities in the Bayesian sense, and that in the limit of an infinite number of measurements, the relative frequencies must approach these probabilities" (ibid, page 1-2). Different from this rather sophisticated justification, the probabilities in the theory proposed here derive from a straightforward generalization of the Laplacian rule to a continuum of possibilities. I conclude that Tipler's approach is conceptually different from the theory proposed here.
Why should the worlds form a continuum?
In a recent paper, Vaidman (2014) discusses numerous formulations and interpretations of quantum mechanics, and in particular the idea put forward in Tipler (2006) and in Boström (2012) , of a continuum of worlds existing in parallel. Although Vaidman strongly argues for a multiplicity of worlds, he rejects the idea that there is a continuum of them. Rather, so he argues, there can only be a large but finite number of parallel worlds. He writes (Vaidman, 2014, p. 24 
If in any region of the configuration space there is an infinity of worlds, we cannot say that it is smaller or larger than in another region. [. . . ] Boström apparently adopts the concept of the measure of existence. His proposal for "volume of worlds" (16) includes also the "weight" of each world |Ψ t (q)| 2 . But then, I do not see how it can be considered as a density of worlds.
As far as I can understand, for an infinite number of worlds there is no mathematical formalism which can provide a "density of worlds" picture.
In the same context, with regard to Albert and Loewer's many-minds approach (Albert & Loewer, 1988) , where the authors propose a continuum of minds together with a measure on the totality of minds, Vaidman writes: "There is no mathematical formalism which provides such a measure". In line with Vaidman, Hall et al. (2014) and Sebens (2014) propose to consider a large but finite set of worlds, which they identify with Bohmian trajectories. Although they admit that only in the limit of a continuum of worlds the predictions of standard quantum mechanics are exactly reproduced, they insist on a finite set. Sebens (2014, p. 14) writes:
The meaning of ρ becomes unclear if we move to a continuous infinity of worlds since we can no longer understand ρ as yielding the proportion of all worlds in a given volume of configuration space upon integration over that volume. There would be infinite worlds in any finite volume (where ρ = 0) and infinite total worlds. I do not share these worries. The mathematical formalism that I and certainly also other authors tacitly refer to when considering a continuum of worlds (or minds) endowed with a measure, is measure theory. Briefly, a measure is a function µ on a collection Σ of subsets of a set X , which maps each subset X ∈ Σ to a non-negative number µ(X) called the measure of X. The collection Σ is called a sigma-algebra of the set X , and its elements are called µ-measurable subsets of X . Both the sigma-algebra and the measure fulfill certain axioms. The cardinality of X does not matter; it might be finite, countable, continuous, or of even higher cardinality. Measure theory forms the basis of integral theory, for the Lebesgue integral λ(X) =´X dx can be regarded as a measure on the vector space X = R N . Any measure on a Lebesgue-integrable space can be associated with a density ρ, such that µ(X) =´X dx ρ(x). The Lebesgue measure itself, for example, has the trivial density ρ ≡ 1. The interpretation of a regular, i.e non-singular, density is that of a distribution of continuous stuff (a fluid, say) across the space X , so that µ(X) yields the volume of stuff (amount of stuff) contained within a given region X ⊂ X . In regions where the density is higher, there is more stuff than in other regions where the density is lower. More precisely, the expression dµ(x) = ρ(x) dx corresponds to the infinitesimal volume of stuff contained in an infinitesimally small region centered at the point x, so if ρ(x) > ρ(y) then at x there is more stuff than at y, and if ρ(x) = 0 than at x there is no stuff.
Even discrete measures, such as
can be associated with a density, albeit a non-regular one. In the above example the associated density is the delta distribution δ(x). In fact, any regular or non-regular distribution can be interpreted as the density of a particular measure. That way, not only continuous stuff but also discontinuous stuff, such as particles, can formally be distributed with a (non-regular) density
where x i is the location of the i-the particle in the vector space X . The corresponding measure µ(X) then simply counts the particles contained within a given set X. From the perspective of measure theory, counting is just a special case of measuring. When applied to infinite sets, measure theory reflects our intuition about one set being somewhat "bigger" than another set, although both sets are of the same infinite cardinality. So, for example, the interval [0, 2] intuitively appears to be "bigger" than the interval [0, 1], although both sets are of the same cardinality c, which is the cardinality of the continuum. In fact, the Lebesgue measure of [0, 2] is two, while the measure of [0, 1] is one, so the first interval is, in the sense of measure theory, "bigger" than the latter.
With regard to probabilities, it is not the cardinality of sets that matters, but rather it is their measure. For example, when randomly picking a point within the interval [0, b] , the probability that the point lies within the interval [0, a] for 0 ≤ a ≤ b equals the ratio a/b of their Lebesgue measures. Similarly, when throwing a dart at a disk covering the region X ⊂ R 2 , then the probability of randomly hitting some region X ⊂ X is given by the ratio of their Lebesgue measures, P = λ(X)/λ(X ). The crucial role of measures for the calculation of probabilities is not a mere coincidence. As a matter of fact, probability theory itself is mathematically grounded on measure theory, hence talking about probabilities is actually nothing but talking about measures. The close relation between measures and probabilities is also the reason why Monte-Carlo integration works.
In the case of a continuum it makes no sense to assign each point in the continuum a probability; this is only possible for the discrete (countable) case. So, instead of talking about a point x possessing the probability p(x) to be selected at random, as is possible in the discrete case, one must generally talk about a set X possessing the probability P (X) to contain a randomly selected point x. This talk is valid for both the discrete and the continuous case. With regard to worlds, one must talk about the (epistemic) probability of finding oneself living in a world contained in a set of worlds W ⊂ W, which is given by P (W ) = ν(W )/ν(W), where ν is a measure on the set of worlds. Each world w ∈ W corresponds to a trajectory q w , which crosses at time t the point q w (t) in configuration space. If the set of worlds W forms a continuum then the set Q W (t) = {q w (t) | w ∈ W} of world configurations at time t also forms a continuum embedded in configuration space. By postulate, ρ t = |Ψ t | 2 is the density of these world configurations in configuration space at time t, so µ t (Q) =´Q dq |Ψ t | 2 measures the volume of worlds whose trajectory crosses at time t the region Q in configuration space. With W Q (t) = {w ∈ W | q w (t) ∈ Q} being the set of worlds whose configuration crosses at time t the region Q, we therefore have ν(W Q (t)) = µ t (Q), so that the probability to find oneself in a world whose configuration crosses at time t the region Q is given by
Note that if the worlds in W would not form a continuum, then µ t would have to be a discrete measure with a non-regular density ρ t , which could not possibly coincide with |Ψ t | 2 , as Ψ t must be square-integrable and cannot be singular. Note further that the epistemic probability of finding oneself living in a precisely specified world w is zero, because individual points in a continuum have a zero measure. This does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to actually live in a single world. Rather, it means that the probability to guess the world in which one lives, is zero. (Remember, the probability is epistemic, not ontic.)
If the world density within a certain region Q is smaller than unity, one might be tempted to assume that in Q there must be holes, that is, places where it is impossible for a world to exist. However, this is not necessarily the case. The worlds form a continuum, and a continuum does not have to have holes for its density to be decreased. As a simple toy model consider a set X = [0, 1] of "worlds" being embedded into a set Y = [0, 1] of "configurations" by the function f (x) = x 2 . The function f is a bijection here, so the set Y is entirely filled with points from X without any holes. Still, the density of points taken from X and embedded into Y is not uniform; there are "more" points from X in the lower end of Y than in the upper end. If ν is a measure on X then the measure µ on Y derived from ν is given by µ(Y ) = ν({x ∈ X | f (x) ∈ Y }).
The generic uniform volume measure on a continuous set of real numbers is the Lebesgue measure, so ν(X) =´X dx. We can then explicitely calculate the measure µ on the "configuration space" Y as
=ˆY dy 1 2 √ y ,
so the points from X are distributed within Y according to the density ρ Y (y) = 1 2 √ y . Then, the subjective probability that our actual world has a configuration within a certain region Y ⊂ Y is given by the ratio of the volume of worlds whose configuration lies within Y divided by the volume of all worlds, so P (Y ) = µ(Y )/µ(Y). For example, the probability that our world has a configuration within the interval [0, a] for 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 reads P ([0, a]) = √ a. The toy model illustrates how the notion of a density of worlds embedded in configuration space makes sense also in the case of a continuum of worlds.
Besides these rather mathematical aspects, why should one consider the set of worlds to form a continuum in the first place? Within the framework of my proposal, the answer is quite simple: Because there is a continuum of trajectories that solve the trajectory equation (19) . If only finitely many worlds were allowed, which of these trajectories should be taken as real, and for what reason? Logically, there is an infinite number of possible paths that the configuration of the universe may take. Invoking a differential equation (the trajectory equation) selects the physically possible paths from the logically possible ones, and the so-selected paths derive from one and the same wavefunction Ψ t representing the state of the universe. If only Ψ t , and nothing more, is considered to represent a complete description of the universe, then all paths deriving from Ψ t must be considered as real. Discarding all but a finite number of paths is not only unnecessary and ad hoc, but it requires an additional postulate. And, if one allows for only a finite number of worlds then why not directly postulating that there is just one world, as is done in Bohmian mechanics? Finitely-many-worlds theories based on the conception of worlds as trajectories in configuration space, are axiomatically more demanding than the metaworld theory, as they must specify, in addition to the wavefunction, the trajectories q 1 , . . . , q K of those worlds that are taken as real, so that the objective state of the universe at time t is given by
for K representing the number of objectively existing worlds, and with q k = (q k,1 · · · q k,N ) being the trajectory of the k-th world, whose configuration at time t is given by q k (t).
In the case K = 1 one obtains Bohmian mechanics. The metaworld theory, in contrast, just needs the wavefunction Ψ t to mathematically represent a continuum of trajectories, hence worlds, which are the solutions of the trajectory equation (19) . Therefore, in the metaworld theory the complete state of the universe is given by the wavefunction alone. To explain the empirical fact of the unique outcomes of measurements, also the metaworld theory needs an actual configuration, but it is taken as epistemic rather than ontic. It specifies not the actual configuration of the universe, but rather the configuration that is actual to a particular instance of an observer. With respect to his or her experience, and only so, there is a unique measurement outcome and an actual configuration of the universe. In essence, a complete objective description of Nature that complies with the empirical facts, requires also taking into account the subjective experience of Nature.
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